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The market for single volumes introducing the major political thinkers and themes of the Western 
canon is now a competitive one. As well as Iain Hampsher-Monk’s and Janet Coleman’s classic History 
of Political Thought textbooks (1992, 2000, 2000), options for students or general readers now also 
include Bruce Haddock’s A History of Political Thought: From Antiquity to the Present (2008), and a 
third edition of David Boucher’s (and now Paul Kelly’s) Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present 
(2017). Additions to this genre should be evaluated not for achieving originality or significant 
difference from other similar volumes (which is increasingly difficult), but for offering the student 
concise, unpedantic accuracy, signposting to important and recent scholarship, and an enjoyable 
reading experience; and, to the tutor, a versatile teaching resource. 
Gary Browning’s twist on the genre aims to introduce not only primary authors from 
Machiavelli to Beauvoir, but also the emerging canon of secondary, interpretative commentary that 
has crystallized around each thinker. So the ‘contextualist’ scholarship of Pocock and Skinner on 
Machiavelli is summarized; as are Oakeshott, Collingwood, and Foucault on Hobbes; the work of Dunn 
and Macpherson on Locke; Derrida on Rousseau; Hegel and Foucault on Kant; and Marx, Oakeshott, 
and Collingwood on Hegel. For Marx, Browning surveys a whole cadre including Gadamer, Kautsky, G. 
A. Cohen, Hardt and Negri, and Derrida. Then come Foucault’s treatment of Bentham; Collini and 
Skorupski on Mill; and Foucault and Derrida on Nietzsche. Browning then presents his own study of 
Simone de Beauvoir’s use of Hegel – an addition which is, I think, especially to be welcomed for, as 
Browning points out, The Second Sex has exerted ‘a prolonged impact in opening up the relevance of 
sexual identity to social and ethical questioning’ (p. 363). 
Historians of political thought will probably take issue with Browning’s mapping of their own 
fields of scholarship – which he would anyway have expected. Sympathy is undoubtedly due for 
Browning’s constraints (all of this is surveyed in just over two hundred pages, the second half of the 
book). But some major lines of interpretation are unfortunately passed over. For instance, although 
Browning notes that, ‘On Hegel’s death, opposing camps of Left and Right Hegelians … disputed the 
meaning of his system’ (p. 265), the Right Hegelians are not discussed, and Oakeshott and Collingwood 
are drafted in to provide the alternative interpretation of Hegel to that of Marx. Other commentators 
are perhaps over-represented, especially Foucault, who speaks in the chapters on Hobbes, Kant, and 
Nietzsche, and is allowed to dominate the chapter on Bentham. The reader might feel that stricter 
limiting of introductory material and of Foucault’s and Derrida’s voices would have yielded room for 
some of the missing territory (such as Hegel scholarship) to be covered. Nevertheless, what is included 
will indeed be useful for students in need both of introductions to primary thinkers, and debates to 
engage with in their reading and written work. 
A History of Political Thought is, though, a book of two halves, and so far I have described only 
the second. The first half documents Browning’s ‘determination to get to grips’ with what he calls the 
question of interpretation (p. 2). To this end he surveys what he sees as the main figures in 
interpretation debates: Hegel and Marx, Oakeshott and Collingwood, Skinner (and the ‘Cambridge 
School’, or ‘contextualism’), Derrida, Gadamer, and Foucault. Browning understands each to be 
offering ‘general interpretive approaches’, ‘generic schemes of interpretation’ (p. 2), ‘frames of 
interpretation’, ‘generic ways of interpreting ideas’, ‘interpretive perspectives’ (p. 3), ‘interpretive 
styles’ (p. 388). His intention is to develop a ‘synoptic perspective’ (pp. v, 273) of his own, consciously 
and reflectively informed by those surveyed, and then to apply this perspective to the classic authors, 
without proposing a ‘final statement’ on any of them. In the event, Browning declines to say very 
explicitly what he takes – or perhaps more importantly, what we should take – from the ‘generic 
schemes of interpretation’ surveyed. And, though he refers throughout with approval to Gadamer’s 
‘fusion of interpretive horizons’ (pp. 138, 283, 313, 367), it will not be entirely clear to students 
unversed in Gadamer how these ‘horizons’ themselves should be interpreted. 
Browning’s synopses of these theories of interpretation are not uncritical, but some specialists 
will be quick to identify inaccuracy in the criticisms that are given. He perpetuates, for instance, the 
widespread myth that ‘contextualists’ wish to ‘rule out theoretical critique of past arguments’ (p. 384), 
to proscribe the use of past authors in contemporary debate (p. 85), and that they ‘presume that ideas 
and texts are susceptible of unambiguous intentional analysis’ (p. 86). In fact, it is thought to be 
precisely such ambiguity that might prompt an historian to seek evidence other than the text, if what 
he wants to find out is what an author thought he was doing in saying, writing, publishing, etc. 
Similarly, Collingwood is accused several times of assuming too much separation between past and 
present, and of being unaware that ‘the interpretation of the past is inevitably to be conducted from 
a present’ (pp. 138, 383). Collingwood actually argues the exact opposite of the first, and deals 
explicitly with the second – which elsewhere Browning seems partly to recognize in Collingwood’s 
theory (pp. 48, 373), and in his practice (p. 186).  
The question of interpretation is not settled at the close of the first part of the book because, 
as Browning points out, ‘There is no better way of appreciating what is involved in these frames of 
interpretation than in reviewing how they make sense of actual past thinkers’ (p. 3). He is undoubtedly 
right. But the interpretative narratives concerning the canonical authors are mostly allowed to speak 
for themselves. One also notices that the ‘test cases’ for interpretative approaches are also those with 
which they have already (famously) dealt. It also becomes clear that the interpretation theorists 
selected for the first half of the book are only those who have also offered commentary on the primary 
authors; and likewise, commentators are only included in the second half if they are obviously 
connected to some kind of theory of interpretation in the abstract. The two halves are mutually 
restricting which, although neat, has the disadvantage of leaving out important studies of the primary 
authors and giants of ‘hermeneutic’ debates (Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Wittgenstein, Ricœur). Even if 
the mutual restriction principle is wise, some discussion of the interpretative and hermeneutic 
implications of Kant’s thought might have been a valuable addition (see Makkreel: 1990). 
The question of interpretation, then, is deferred to the conclusion of the book, which 
comprises an original essay, ‘Political thought and history’ (pp. 372-98). Here Browning calls for what 
he calls ‘a plurality of interpretive perspectives’ (p. 372). This is a noble cause, but it is also impossible 
to disagree with. Indeed, one might point out (as Browning acknowledges, p. 396) that in practice such 
pluralism already exists. The argument for ‘interpretive pluralism’ is rather abstract, and does little to 
explain concretely what an ‘interpretive pluralist’ would do differently in practice. For example: ‘A 
dialectical holistic perspective on the history of political thought takes account of the interplay 
between its constitutive conditions and provides a comprehensive interpretive framework that 
encompasses differing features and styles of interpretation’ (p. 392). The reader might suspect that 
Browning is actually exaggerating existing ‘conflict’ among these theories of interpretation, and 
escalating what are really different horses for different courses to the status of rival stables (pp. 375-
82). It is not demonstrated that these different historians, philosophers, commentators, and so forth 
really do claim ‘to provide exclusive and comprehensive forms for interpretation’ (p. 389). It might be 
argued that this is a misunderstanding, generated perhaps by the insufficiently pluralistic 
presupposition that the question of interpretation is uniform. It might be argued further that 
questions of interpretation are better answered within the context of particular investigations; that 
the question, ‘How should I interpret this?’ should be specified with the counter-question, ‘Well, what 
exactly are you trying to find out from it?’; and that any ‘comprehensive interpretive framework’ (p. 
392) needlessly imposes an unprofitable restriction upon investigative autonomy. Browning himself is 
primarily interested in how old arguments might be used today, which is why, with that purpose in 
mind, he is anyway surely right to insist that ‘Intentionality is not the sole guide to the reading of a 
text’ (p. 212). 
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